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Many researchers have studied elaboration, which is the extent to which people 
effortfully think about attitude-relevant information. Despite being effortful, many effects of 
elaboration, such as resistance of change, have largely been attributed to cognitive changes that 
accompany elaboration or to perceptions of elaboration rather than to the effort itself. Yet, it 
seems that effort itself could contribute to a person’s resistance to give up that attitude. In the 
current case, effort can be described as the amount of work put into obtaining information and 
forming an attitude about it. One hundred seventy-three Ohio State University students were 
brought into the lab where they were asked to read an article and form an attitude about the target 
policy in the message. While the participants were reading this article, they were randomly 
assigned to also have a secondary task or not. This secondary task involved simultaneously 
monitoring a string of letters played at a relatively slow rate over headphones while attempting to 
read the article. The intent was for the secondary task to make participants put forth additional 
effort to receive and use the available information. The participants were then asked questions on 
their attitude toward the policy, how much they thought about the information and how difficult 
it was to obtain that information. Finally, the participants read an article that took an opposing 
point of view and then reported their attitude again following that opposing message. The data 
show that there was no significant difference in change in belief between the two secondary task 
conditions, but measures of perceived effort did predict resistance to change above and beyond 
perceptions of elaboration. Further studies will have to be designed with a more refined 
operationalization of variables, such as incorporating other ways to induce effort. For example, 
this could include the use of distracting visual stimuli. This study provides insight into why 
putting more cognitive effort into a task motivates someone to stick with it. 
 Introduction 
Much research has examined the role of elaboration in information processing. In the 
persuasion domain, elaboration, or the amount of thought people put into information they 
receive, impacts how people respond to different aspects of the message. For instance, higher 
levels of elaboration have been found to increase the persuasiveness of strong arguments, 
whereas lower levels of elaboration have been found to increase the persuasiveness of peripheral 
cues unrelated to persuasive content itself (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Additionally, the amount of 
elaboration put into forming attitudes impacts the strength of those attitudes. Attitudes formed 
via high elaboration tend to be stronger, meaning that they tend to persist longer over time and be 
more predictive of behavior, for example, than those formed via low elaboration (Petty, 
Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995). It is argued that elaboration has this effect, at least in part, because it 
allows people to connect and reconcile the attitude with other pieces of knowledge they already 
hold (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Wegener, Patton, & Haugtvedt, 2018).    
Elaboration has an impact on resistance to change. For example, studies show that getting 
people to think carefully about attitude-related information prior to an attack makes them more 
resistant in the face of the attack (Petty et al., 1995). Attitudinal resistance refers to an outcome 
in which the person maintains the attitude in the face of an attack. The results of this research 
showed that the motivation to process information extensively increased resistance to counter-
persuasive messages (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). 
The mere perception of elaboration can also contribute to attitude strength, independent 
of the actual amount of elaboration that occurred. Perceived processing is the extent to which a 
person believes they thought carefully about the information presented to them within a given 
scenario. Past research has used self-reported measures of perceived processing and measures of 
the actual number of thoughts (e.g., thought listings) as ways to measure elaboration (see 
Wegener et al., 1995, for a review). Barden and Petty (2008) showed that perceptions of how 
much one elaborated on a message can influence attitude certainty above and beyond the actual 
amount of elaboration. That is, Barden and Petty (2008) started treating perceptions of 
elaboration as separate from the actual elaboration undertaken and capable of having its own 
effects. Though perceptions of elaboration have been linked (through attitude certainty) to 
consequences like intending to behave in attitude-consistent ways (e.g., Barden & Petty, 2008; 
Wan, Rucker, Tormala, & Clarkson, 2010), it is unclear whether certainty based on perceived 
processing, separate from actual processing, would produce resistance to changing the attitude 
(Barden & Petty, 2008). To the extent that attitude certainty itself has been related to resistance 
to change (see Tormala & Rucker, 2007), however, perceived elaboration might be as well 
(through certainty). 
The Potential Role of Effort 
Although it is well established that elaboration predicts attitude strength outcomes such 
as resistance to persuasion (Krosnick & Petty, 1995), it is possible that an additional variable 
might have been involved in elaboration that has its own distinguishable effects on outcomes 
such as resistance to change. Specifically, the amount of effort one puts into forming an attitude 
might impact the extent to which people want to hold on to their attitudes. For example, imagine 
someone who is not tech-savvy but spends months learning SPSS, a statistical software program, 
in order to appear more desirable to employers. That person might form a favorable attitude 
toward SPSS in the process. However, the person receives a job offer from a company that does 
not value SPSS but only uses R, an alternative statistical software, and would require you to 
learn how to use it for the position. In theory, because that person had put effort into forming 
their attitude toward SPSS, they should be especially likely to keep their positive view of SPSS 
in the face of the employer not valuing the program. As a result of the resistance to change their 
view of SPSS, perhaps they would even be less likely to accept the job.  
Past research and theorizing supports this possibility in certain respects. Abelson (1986) 
argued that beliefs are like possessions. As such, attitudes might be valued differently depending 
on how they were formed, just like how different physical possessions can be differentially 
valued based on how they were obtained. Suffering for a belief or repeatedly defending it 
provides evidence that one values that belief and views it as their own.  
Research on sunk costs more generally is also consistent with this reasoning. Abelson 
(1986) argued that sunk costs are the aversion to losing or giving up something that you worked 
hard to get. Arkes and Blumer (1985) argued that this occurs because people generally do not 
want to think that they are being wasteful. For example, imagine that one person worked really 
hard to obtain a pair of concert tickets while another person was handed a pair for free. If there 
happens to be a snowstorm on the day of the concert, the person who worked hard for their 
tickets should be more likely to risk an attempt at driving to the concert anyway so as not to 
“waste” their investment in the ticket (Thaler, 1980). Abelson (1986) argued that beliefs are 
subject to similar processes. If one exerts much effort to form a belief or attitude, one will not 
want to subsequently “waste” that effort by changing that belief or attitude.  
If someone puts a lot of effort into gaining an attitude but then gives up on that attitude 
and adopts another, that would be inconsistent with the amount of effort they had expended. This 
idea stems from research on cognitive dissonance, a theory suggesting that one feels physically 
uncomfortable when their thoughts do not match their actions and they are motivated to resolve 
the inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). Participants who try to overcome a secondary task to read 
and process a message must exert additional effort to some degree, in order to gain information 
from the message. In the current work, I sought to create this type of situation while not 
undermining the extent to which people thought they could elaborate, as secondary tasks that are 
intensive enough can reduce ability to elaborate (Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976). 
It is useful to note that mere perceptions of effort, regardless of the amount of effort 
actually exerted, might be sufficient to produce this desire to hold on to an attitude that one has 
formed. This distinction is similar to the one made between actual elaboration and perceived 
elaboration (Barden & Petty, 2008). A similar process might occur with the attitudes we form. If 
people think of their attitudes as possessions, attitudes one worked hard to form might be ones 
people are especially resistant to change. 
Main Study 
This study was designed to disentangle the effects of perceptions of elaboration and effort 
on resistance to change. This study measured participants' attitudes toward a topic alongside 
measuring how much they thought about the topic and how much work they put into gaining 
information on the topic. I manipulated needed effort by introducing a secondary task for some 
participants that they could overcome, ideally with some success so that the amount of perceived 
elaboration is not closely tied to perceptions of amount of effort expended. The variables I 
measured included perceived elaboration, perceived effort, perceived attitude utility, resistance 
to change, and initial and post-counterattack attitudes. 
My first hypothesis was that perceived elaboration and perceived effort would 
independently predict desire to hold on to an initial attitude. I also hypothesized that perceived 
elaboration and perceived effort would independently predict actual attitude change (i.e., 
resistance to change). 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and seventy-three participants were recruited from The Ohio 
State University undergraduate Psychology 1100 classes through the Research Experience 
Program (REP). The participants were 52.9% male and 47.1% female. The mean age of 
participants was 18 years old. 
Measures and Manipulations. 
Initial and attack messages 
All study materials were created in Qualtrics and were presented on a computer screen. 
Two messages were used in this study: an initial message containing strong arguments and an 
attacking message containing weak arguments. The messages used were adapted from those used 
by Blankenship and Wegener (2008). Participants in the low- and high-effort conditions each 
received, both, the initial message and the attacking message. The initial message provided a 
series of strong arguments as to why a fictitious country, Tashkentsistan, should be allowed into 
the European Union (EU). The attacking message provided a serious of weak arguments as to 
why Tashkentistan should not be allowed into the EU. 
Effort manipulation 
All participants were asked to wear headphones for the duration of the study. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the low or high effort condition. The high effort condition included a 
series of letters played over the headphones while the participants read the initial message, 
adapting a secondary task that is typically used for the purpose of distracting participants from 
the attitude-relevant information and decreasing their ability to elaborate (cf. Wegener, Clark, & 
Petty, 2006). In the current case, there was a ten second pause between each letter was presented. 
Participants in the high-effort condition were asked to keep track of the number of vowels heard 
while simultaneously reading the article. Those in the low-effort condition heard no letters while 
they read the message and were not tasked to count anything while reading the message. 
Perceived elaboration measure 
Based on the measures used by Barden and Petty (2008) to assess participants’ perceived 
elaboration, we asked three questions of participants following their reading of the initial 
message, each answered using 7-point unipolar scales. Each participant was asked: “To what 
extent did you think about the message?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much), “To what 
extent did you consider the message?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much), and “To 
what extent did you pay attention to the message?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much). 
Those participants who reported thinking, considering, and paying attention to the message were 
considered as having had higher perceived elaboration. 
Perceived effort measure 
Three similar 7-point scales were used to assess participants’ perceived effort. Each 
participant was asked: “To what extent did you need to put in a lot of effort into forming your 
position on letting Tashkentistan into the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much), “To 
what extent did you need to try hard while forming your position on letting Tashkentistan into 
the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much), and “To what extent did you need to 
work hard while forming your position on letting Tashkentistan into the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- 
Not at all to 7- Very much). Higher ratings of effort, trying hard, and working hard to gain 
information from the message indicated higher perceived effort. 
Perceived attitude utility measure 
Three 7-point scales were used to assess participants’ perceptions of the validity of the 
attitudes they formed. Each participant was asked: “To what extent do you feel that you can rely 
on your opinion about whether Tashkentistan should be allowed to join the EU?” (7-point scale: 
1- Not at all to 7- Very much), “To what extent do you feel that you can depend on your opinion 
about whether Tashkentistan should be allowed to join the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 
7- Very much), and “To what extent do you believe that your opinion about whether 
Tashkentistan should be allowed to join the EU is credible?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- 
Very much). Higher ratings of being able to rely on their opinions about the message equated to a 
higher perceived validity of their attitudes. 
Resistance to change measure 
Three 7-point scales were used to assess participants’ reported loyalty to the attitudes that 
they formed on the topic. Each participant was asked: “To what extent do you desire to hold on 
to your opinion of whether Tashkentistan should join the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- 
Very much), “To what extent do you feel compelled to hold on to your opinion of whether 
Tashkentistan should join the EU?” (7-point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much), and “To what 
extent do you feel devoted to your opinion of whether Tashkentistan should join the EU?” (7-
point scale: 1- Not at all to 7- Very much). Higher ratings on participants' desire to hold on to 
their opinion indicated a higher reported resistance to changing their attitude in the face of a 
counterattacking message. 
Post-initial message and post-attack message attitude measure 
Three 9-point bipolar scales were used to assess participants' attitudes immediately after 
reading the initial message and once again after reading the attacking message. Each participant 
was asked: “To what extent do you believe allowing Tashkentistan into the EU is:” (9-point 
scale: -4- Negative to 4- Positive), “Allowing Tashkentistan into the EU is:” (9-point scale: -4- 
Bad to 4- Good), and “How favorable do you find allowing Tashkentistan into the EU to be?” (9-
point scale: -4- Unfavorable to 4- Favorable). Higher ratings reflected more favorable views of 
Tashkentistan entering the EU. The same items were used both after the initial message and after 
the attacking message. 
Need for cognition measure 
Participants were asked to respond to eighteen 5-point scales asking about their desire to 
think critically in their everyday lives (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). An example item was, “I 
really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.”. An example of a 
reverse-scored item was, “I only think as hard as I have to”. The response scale ranged from –2 
(Extremely Uncharacteristic of Me) to 2 (Extremely Characteristic of Me). Higher scores 
indicated higher levels of motivation to think carefully (i.e., need for cognition). 
Procedure. Participants were brought into the research lab to complete an online survey 
created using Qualtrics software. The study began by presenting the participants with a message 
about allowing a fictitious country, Tashkentistan, into the EU (taken from Blankenship & 
Wegener, 2008). All of the participants read the message on the screen. The independent variable 
was the presence or absence of a secondary task designed to make participants put in more effort 
(when the secondary task was present) or less effort into reading about the policy. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the high- or low-effort condition. The secondary task in the high-
effort condition was formulated to attempt to increase the necessary effort without undermining 
participants’ ability to process the information. After the initial message, participants reported 
their overall attitude toward the policy. The participants then received the attacking message, 
which tested their resistance to change. After the attacking message, participants reported their 




To ensure that participants believed that they thought a lot about the initial message they 
read, an independent t-test was conducted. Though I was hoping that perceived elaboration 
would be relatively equal across effort conditions, participants in the low-effort condition 
reported thinking more about the message (M = 4.73, SD = 1.19) than those in the high-effort 
condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.38), t(170) = 3.14, p = .002. 
Perceived Effort 
To test whether participants in the high-effort condition reported having to put more 
effort into gaining information on the topic, an independent t-test was conducted. Unfortunately, 
participants in the high-effort condition (M = 3.50, SD= 1.23) did not report putting much more 
effort into gaining information than the low-effort condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.41), t(170) = -
1.16, p = .250. 
Perceived Attitude utility 
To test how much participants felt they could rely on their initial attitude, an independent 
t-test was conducted. Participants in the low-effort condition felt they could depend on their 
attitude a bit more (M = 3.61, SD= 1.46) than those in the high-effort condition (M = 3.35, SD = 
1.36), but not significantly so, t(170) = 1.20, p = .230. 
Reported Resistance to Change 
To test participants' desire to hold on to their attitude, an independent t-test was 
conducted. Participants in the low-effort condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.44) did not differ in their 
desire to hold on to their initial attitude compared to the participants in the high-effort condition 
(M = 2.95, SD =1.32), t(170) = .147, p = .883.  
I also predicted that perceived elaboration and perceived effort would independently 
relate to reported will to hold on to one’s attitude. Therefore, I conducted a regression analysis in 
which the measures of perceived elaboration and perceived effort both predicted participants’ 
reported resistance to change.  In that regression, perceived effort significantly predicted reports 
of resistance, b = .227, se = .076, t(171) = 2.99, p = .003, as did perceived elaboration, b = .256, 
se = .076, t(171) = 3.37, p = .001. 
Attitude Change 
To test whether participants changed their initial attitude after receiving the 
counterattacking message, an independent t-test was conducted. This variable was created by 
subtracting participants’ initial message attitudes from their post-attack message attitudes, such 
that more negative scores reflected participants being swayed more by the attacking message. 
Participants in the low-effort condition (M = -1.37, SD = 1.55) were slightly more likely to give 
up their initial attitude in the face of an attack when compared to those in the high-effort 
condition, but not significantly so (M = -1.25, SD = 1.96), t(170) = -.431, p = .667.  
I also predicted that perceived elaboration and perceived effort would independently 
relate to reported change in attitude. Therefore, I conducted a regression analysis in which the 
measures of perceived elaboration and perceived effort both predicted participants’ reported 
post-counterattacking message attitude minus their post-initial message attitude.  In that 
regression, perceived effort did not significantly predict attitude change, b = .094, se = .100, 
t(171) = .93, p = .352, but perceived elaboration did, b = -.285, se = .100, t(171) = -2.83, p = 
.005. I followed-up with another regression including perceived effort and perceived elaboration 
plus the desire to hold on to one’s attitudes related to reported change in attitude. Perceived 
effort again did not predict attitude change, b = .128, se = .103, t(171) = 1.24, p = .215, but 
perceived elaboration did, b = -.246, se = .103, t(171) = -2.38, p = .018. Reported resistance to 
change did not predict alongside perceived elaboration, b = -.150, se = .102, t(171) = -1.48, p = 
.140.  
Finally, because previous research linked strength effects of perceived elaboration to 
attitude certainty, I conducted an additional regression analysis that added the variable of 
perceived validity of the attitude to the previous regression. In this regression, none of the 
variables significantly predicted, though perceived elaboration and perceptions of attitude utility 
came close; perceived effort, b = .140, se = .102, t(171) = 1.37, p = .173; perceived elaboration, 
b = -.185, se = .109, t(171) = -1.70, p = .092; reported resistance to change, b = .001, se = .136, 
t(171) = .004, p = .997; perceived validity of attitude, b = -.231, se = .141, t(171) = -1.65, p = 
.101. Thus, reported resistance to attitude change weakens the effect of perceived elaboration a 
small amount, but the perceived validity of attitude weakens effects of perceived elaboration to a 
greater degree. The data are not entirely consistent with perceived attitude utility being 
responsible for influences of perceived elaboration, however, in that perceptions of attitude 
utility did not significantly predict attitude change when controlling for perceived elaboration. 
 
Discussion 
Results supported the hypothesis that perceived elaboration and perceived effort 
independently predict resistance to change. However, the experimental results were not 
supportive of my hypotheses.  In part, that seems to be the case because the experimental 
conditions were not set up as intended. That is, participants in the high-effort condition did not 
report having to put more effort into receiving the initial message than participants in the low-
effort condition. Instead, participants in the high-effort condition reported that they put less 
thought (elaboration) into the message than those in the low-effort condition.  Using a secondary 
task that could potentially reduce perceptions of elaboration while increasing perceived effort 
seemed like a good place to start in looking for unique effects of effort, but I was not able to 
create a manipulation that primarily affected perceived effort and not perceived elaboration. In a 
previous attempt, a stronger “distraction” manipulation more strongly influenced both 
perceptions of effort and elaboration, but perceptions of effort in that context did not predict 
reported or actual resistance to attitude change. This could be attributed to the fact that the effort 
was viewed as unsuccessful in allowing people to form a reliable attitude. 
Participants reported wanting to hold on to their attitude (reported resistance) but then 
they did the opposite (attitude change). I expected an effect of both perceived elaboration and 
effort but I did not find that. A key finding, however, is that perceptions of elaboration and effort 
do seem to be two separate variables that should be further disentangled. There may be 
interesting implications for finding that elaboration and effort uniquely predict the desire to hold 
on to an attitude, especially if this finding can go beyond desire to hold on to an attitude to 
predict actual resistance to change. The data do have similar findings to the Barden and Petty 
(2008) paper in the fact that they both show that perceived elaboration is doing most of the work 
related to forming an attitude. However, the data do add the consequence that perceived 
elaboration is also related to resistance to attitude change but the data are less conclusive as to if 
perceived validity of attitude is related to this conclusion. 
Future Directions 
In future studies, it would be useful to reconceptualize the way that the variable of effort 
is manipulated. This is an important step in disentangling effort and elaboration. This could be 
done by using a visual stimulus, such as a light-colored font, rather than an auditory stimulus. 
Another possible idea would be to make the independent variable less distracting while making 
the participant feel that they are putting more work into gaining the information. It could also be 
important to inform people about how much effort they put in. This could reinforce the idea that 
they worked hard at gaining this information and that they should want to resist changing their 
attitude. Additionally, it would be important to have participants feel as though they freely 
undertook the effort involved in accessing the available information. In the Linder et al. (1968) 
paper, it became clear that counter-attitudinal efforts primarily resulted in changes in attitudes 
when people believed that they freely undertook the action. Similarly, here, if people thought 
that they freely undertook the effort to overcome the secondary task and process the message, 
that effort should make them want to hold onto the attitude more than if they thought that they 
had no choice but to do it (as that is what this experiment required).  Thus, in future attempts to 
introduce some additional effort participants must undertake, it would likely be helpful to also 
get participants to express a personal willingness to undertake that additional effort. Furthermore, 
it would be important to look at whether effort predicts other attitude strength outcomes, such as, 
an attitude’s persistence over time or its predictability of behavior. This would allow us to see 
whether the observed relations between perceived effort and will to hold on to an attitude is 
unique to resistance to change, or perceived effort might also increase attitude strength more 
generally.  
In conclusion, the present research provides several insights into the variable of perceived 
effort. A regression analysis showed that perceived elaboration and perceived effort 
independently predict resistance to attitude change. The effect of perceived elaboration is 
weakened by the effects of reported resistance to attitude change and perceived validity of 
attitude, but perceived elaboration generally seems like the most potent predictor of resistance to 
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  Appendix 
Materials 
Attitude: 
[Attitude object] is: 
Or 
To what extent do you believe [attitude object] is:  
Or 
How good/positive/beneficial etc. did you find [attitude object] to be? (9 pt 
Semantic Differential) 
bad – good  
negative – positive   
unfavorable – favorable 
 
Perceived Elaboration (7-point unipolar, adapting Barden, J., & Petty, R. E. (2008)) 
“To what extent did you think about [attitude object]?” 
“To what extent did you consider [attitude object]?” 
“To what extent did you pay attention to [attitude object]?” 
 
Perceived Effort (7-point unipolar) 
“To what extent did you need to put in a lot of effort while reading [attitude object]?” 
“To what extent did you need to try hard while reading [attitude object]?” 
“To what extent did you need to work hard while reading [attitude object]?” 
 
Perceived Attitude Utility (7-point unipolar; based on Bizer et al., 2006; Krosnick 
and Abelson, 1992):  
“To what extent do you feel that you can rely on your opinion about (attitude 
object)?” (extremely certain / not at all certain) 
“To what extent do you feel that you can depend on your opinion about (attitude 
object)?” (extremely certain / not at all certain) 
“To what extent do you believe that your opinion about (attitude object), is 
credible?” (extremely credible / not at all credible) 
 
Resistance to Change (7-point unipolar) 
To what extent do you desire to hold on to your opinion of (attitude object)? (not 
at all / very much) 
To what extent do you feel compelled to hold on to your opinion of (attitude 
object)? (not at all / very much) 
To what extent do you feel devoted to your opinion of (attitude object)? (not at all 
/ very much) 
 
Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) 
* reverse-scored. 
 
Participants respond to the these items using the following scale: 
 
+2 = extremely characteristic of me 
+1 = somewhat characteristic of me  
  0 = undecided 
 -1 = somewhat uncharacteristic of me 
 -2 = extremely uncharacteristic of me 
 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.* 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think 
in depth about something.* 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort.* 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.* 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 
 
 
 
 
